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Executive Summary 
Afghan demining is in a period of momentous change.  After 16 years of UN-led and 
NGO-implemented mine action, the last two years have seen the influx of commercial 
demining companies.  This has the potential to enhance the capacity of Afghan demining, 
through greater profit-driven efficiency, innovation and specialization.  Moreover, it is 
unlikely that many NGOs would be able, or willing, to do mine and UXO clearance tasks 
for the Coalition and Afghan militaries.  Thus some involvement of commercial 
companies in Afghan demining should be welcomed.  However, there are also possible 
disadvantages to commercialization: 
 
1) Without tight controls and a clear regulatory framework, using commercial 
companies risks lowering the quality and safety of the demining process, 
2) Turning demining into a purchasable commodity risks drawing demining 
resources away from those who need mine clearance the most, as those who 
can pay get demining first, 
3) Commercialization, which has seen the growing role of private security 
contractors in demining, has occurred in tandem with the merging of US aid 
and security policy in Afghanistan.  As a result, there is a danger that neutral 
‘humanitarian space’ for demining may be reduced. 
 
Acknowledging that to a large degree commercialization is a fait accompli, the author 
has the following recommendations: 
 
To UNMACA: 
1. Build confidence in the UN-led system by addressing weaknesses in transparency 
and perceptions of unnecessary bureaucratic inertia. 
2. Continue with organizational reform to improve donor reporting, transparency, 
better data collection and operational efficiency. 
3. Commission a study into the economic, political and social impacts of the 
commercialization of demining in Afghanistan, and ways to make best use of the 
commercial potential. 
4. Rapidly expand the capacity of the quality management structure of UNMACA 
and centralize the reporting from these teams in a headquarters database. 
5. Improve the demining accident database and integrate this into IMSMA 
(Information Management System for Mine Action) properly. 
6. Collate and analyze the quality management and accident data regularly and take 
accreditation away from organization that have consistently poor safety records. 
7. Fundraise aggressively to maintain the humanitarian demining capacity at its 
current level. 
8. Strengthen the NGO sector by encouraging transparency, building technical 
capacity and introducing elements of moderate competition for grants, so they are 
able to stem the hemorrhaging of talent to commercial companies. 
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To the agencies of the US government: 
1. Maintain some funding for the UN-led system, conditional on improvements in 
transparency, efficiency and data reporting. 
2. Support a UN-commissioned study into the economic, political and social impacts 
of the commercialization of demining in Afghanistan. 
3. Ensure that reconstruction demining contractors are penalized for poor safety 
practices. 
4. Strengthen the NGO sector by encouraging transparency, building technical 
capacity and introducing elements of moderate competition for grants, so they are 
able to stem the hemorrhaging of talent to commercial companies. 
5. Give security clearance to more UNMACA quality management inspectors to 
observe the work of commercial contractors in Coalition secure areas. 
6. Include tight caveat in commercials contracts emphasizing and ensuring the 
power of UNMACA is maintained. Ensure that contracts mandate submission of 
all clearance and accident data to them in a timely manner. 
7. Be cautious about introducing commercialization into other demining programs in 
other countries. 
 
To other bilateral donors: 
1. Maintain and bolster funding for the UN-led demining system, conditional on 
improvements in transparency, operational efficiency and data reporting. 
2. Support a UN-commissioned study into the economic, political and social impacts 
of the commercialization of demining in Afghanistan. 
3. Include tight caveats in commercials contracts emphasizing and ensuring the 
power of UNMACA is maintained. Ensure that contracts mandate submission of 
all clearance and accident data to them in a timely manner. 
4. Be cautious about introducing commercialization into other demining programs in 
other countries. 
 
To prime reconstruction contractors: 
1. Improve coordination with UNMACA, make sure they are fully aware of all 
demining and BAC contracts. 
2. Include tight caveats in commercials contracts emphasizing and ensuring the 
power of UNMACA is maintained.  Ensure that contracts mandate submission of 
all clearance and accident data to them in a timely manner. 
3. Consider making client-provided private quality assurance inspection reports 
available in one central location (ideally UNMACA) so information on contractor 
performance is available to all clients. 
 
To commercial demining companies: 
1. Improve coordination with UNMACA, make sure they are fully aware of all 
demining and BAC operations, and submit all clearance and accident data to them 
in a timely manner. 
2. Resist the temptation to cut corners in the SOPs, or to speed up the demining 
process beyond what is safe. 
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3. Consider the negative implications of using a private security capacity and having 
employees bearing arms, and the impact on the image of all demining agencies.   
4. Go first to the pool of unemployed deminers for labor, rather than hiring talent 
away the Afghan NGOs.  Consider setting payscales at an appropriate level, in 
consultation with UNMACA. 
 
To the Afghan NGOs: 
1. Build donor confidence by continuing to improve transparency, technical 
competence and management capacity. 
2. Consider adopting some of the new technologies and innovations brought into the 
country by commercial operators. 
3. Deal with the tough question of how the Afghan Demining Group’s (ADG) 
profits will be distributed among the five NGOs and make a legal, written 
agreement. 
4. Maintain close supervision over ADG to ensure it maintains the highest possible 
standards of clearance. 
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1. Introduction 
Afghanistan is considered the birthplace of humanitarian mine action. The demining 
methods and protocols developed in the early 1990s by the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID), HALO Trust and UN, through adapting military mine breaching 
and explosive detection techniques, were exported to mine-affected countries all over the 
globe.  In addition to being the oldest humanitarian demining program, the Mine Action 
Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) is also the biggest, employing almost 10,000 people at 
its peak a couple years ago. 
However, Afghan demining is in a period of momentous change.  After 16 years of 
UN-led and NGO-implemented mine action, the last two years have seen the influx of 
seven international commercial demining companies.  With encouragement from USAID 
and the US State Department, and approval from the UN Mine Action Center for 
Afghanistan (UNMACA), the five main local demining NGOs are also spinning off 
commercial operations. Surprisingly, despite US rhetoric extolling the benefits of 
commercialization, there has been remarkably little research or analysis into who will 
benefit from such a drastic system change, how it will affect the implementation of mine 
clearance, and whether there are safety implications. 
This paper aims to provide such analysis, and is part of a broader multi-country 
investigation by the author, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, 
into the politics, policy and governance of demining.1  The overarching assumption of 
this project is that the political and economic organization of demining has an impact on 
the quality, safety and efficiency of the process.  The author thus believes that mine 
action policymakers in Afghanistan must be politically and economically aware, for as 
the studies in New Institutional Economics show, ‘institutions matter’ – the rules of the 
game do impact outcomes.  In addition to a comprehensive literature review and 
interviews with key players in Washington DC and New York, this particular paper is the 
result of two months fieldwork in Kabul, Afghanistan.   The author interviewed almost 40 
officials in all the major demining organizations in Afghanistan, observed several 
demining sites and collected quantitative data where possible. 
Aside from this study, there has been some discussion of the comparative advantages 
of commercial companies versus NGOs, or tender versus grant funding, within the mine 
action community, but the literature is often anecdotal, focused only on individual case 
studies and far from conclusive.  Fitz-Gerald and Neal, for instance, argued in favor of 
using commercial companies (though not against NGOs), arguing they are efficient.2  In 
contrast, Howell argued in favor of using NGOs, saying their humanitarian motives put 
them on the leading edge of advocacy efforts, developing standards and putting the 
community before contract.3 However, both of these articles avoid any in-depth scholarly 
analysis of efficiency, quality or impact.   
In an attempt to address this deficiency, Banks’ 2003 article argued forcefully in 
favor of “a more business-like response to mine action.”  Using quantitative analysis he 
demonstrated that commercial tendering, rather than granting, mine action funding led to 
                                                 
1
 For a similar report presenting findings from Bosnia, see: Bolton & Griffiths 2006. 
2
 Fitz-Gerald, A. & Neal, D.J. (2000) “Dispelling the Myth Between Humanitarian and Commercial Mine 
Action Activity.” Journal of Mine Action. 4.3. <http://maic.jmu.edu/Journal/4.3/features/myth/myth.htm>. 
3
 Howell, B. (May 1997) “NGOs perform vital role.” Landmines. 22. pp. 10, 11, 13. 
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much higher productivity and lower costs in Bosnia.  He argued that mine action donors 
had a humanitarian imperative to clear land as quickly as possible (to save lives) and thus 
institute competitive contracting systems.4   
The problem with Banks’ analysis was that it focused solely on judgments of speed 
and price.  With Hugh Griffiths, this author has argued that one must also account for the 
quality and safety of the demining process, showing quantitative data that suggests 
Bosnian organizations receiving funding through tendering had more demining accidents 
than those that relied grants or regular public budgeting.5  Another problem with Banks’ 
analysis is a lack of detailed consideration of more qualitative issues.  For instance, the 
World Bank,6 the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)7 
and Bolton and Griffiths8 all warn that tendering systems can become corrupted in post-
conflict countries (where mine action takes place) where there is not strong rule of law 
and can even strengthen a corrosive political economy of conflict.  Other qualitative 
issues worth considering in analysis of demining commercialization include: NGOs’ 
touted comparative advantage at interacting with local communities,9 the vested interests 
international NGOs may have in avoiding local capacity building10 and the negative 
perceptions of private security companies involved in demining.11 
This policy paper will draw on this nascent literature and try to advance it, by 
examining the impact of commercialization on the Afghan demining sector through both 
quantitative and qualitative lenses, and arguing that while there are some benefits in 
terms of speed, lower prices, specialization and innovation: 
 
1) Without tight controls and a clear regulatory framework, using commercial 
companies risks lowering the quality and safety of the demining process, 
2) Turning demining into a purchasable commodity risks drawing demining 
resources away from those who need mine clearance the most, as those who can 
pay get demining first, 
3) Commercialization, which has seen the growing role of private security 
contractors in demining, has occurred in tandem with the merging of US aid and 
                                                 
4
 Banks, E. (August 2003) “In the Name of Humanity.” Journal of Mine Action. 7.2. 
<http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/7.2/focus/banks/banks.htm>. 
5
 Bolton, M. & Griffiths, H. (September 2006) Bosnia’s Political Landmines: A Call for Socially 
Responsible and Conflict-Sensitive Mine Action. London, Landmine Action. 
<http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Bosnias_Political_Landmines.pdf>. 
6
 Buré, J. & Pont, P. (November 2003) “Landmine Clearance Projects: A Task Manager’s Guide.” Social 
Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction 10. 
<http://go.worldbank.org/H9XPUBHKP0>. pp. 18-19. 
7
 GICHD. (2004) A Study of Local Organisations in Mine Action. Geneva, GICHD. pp. 45-89. 
8
 Bolton & Griffiths 2006. 
9
 Maslen, S. (2004) Mine Action After Diana: Progress in the Struggle Against Landmines. London, Pluto 
Press. p. 145. 
10
 GICHD 2004, pp. 65-67, 86-87. 
11
 Spearin, C. (November 2001) “Ends and Means: Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of Commercialised 
Security on the Ottawa Convention Banning Anti-Personnel Mines.” YCISS Occasional Paper Number. 69.  
More provocatively, Donovan has objected to the links certain commercial companies have to arms 
manufacturing: Donovan, P. (September 1997) “Making a Killing.” New Internationalist. 
<http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/landmines_html/MakingKilling_NI.html>. 
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security policy in Afghanistan.  As a result, there is a danger that neutral 
‘humanitarian space’ for demining may be reduced. 
 
After an overview of the history of demining in Afghanistan, the paper will explain 
how the processes of commercialization have occurred and briefly profile the market.  
The rest of the paper examines the impacts of commercialization:  First, an examination 
of the possible benefits of commercialization, with regards to price, productivity, 
specialization and innovation.  Second, a look at the possible problems of 
commercialization, including reduced safety, commodification and the use of demining to 
further the security interests of the US and its Coalition partners.  The paper ends with 
some general conclusions and recommends ways to limit the risks associated with 
commercialization. 
2. A Brief History of Afghan Demining 
To understand the changing structure of demining in today’s Afghanistan it is 
important to understand that its polity did not simply drop out of heaven. This section 
tells the story of three distinct Afghan demining programs that began at the end of the 
1980s, how the UN-led program became ascendant and absorbed the others and how the 
aftermath of September 11 led to a major shake up in Afghan demining. 
2.1 The Three Roots of Afghan Demining, 1987-1994 
The roots of Afghan demining lie in the significant humanitarian and strategic interest 
in Afghanistan at the end of 1980s.  Following the Soviet invasion of the country in 1979, 
as much as half the population was displaced, many of them fleeing to Pakistan or Iran.  
Battles between the Communist government forces and the US, Saudi and Pakistan-
backed rebels wrought considerable destruction to human life, infrastructure and 
livelihood. From 1985 onwards USAID operated a massive Cross-Border Humanitarian 
Assistance Program from Pakistan aimed at supporting the anti-Soviet mujahideen parties 
logistically (through provision of ‘dual-use’ assistance) and politically (by building the 
credibility of the parties to provide services to the populace in the ‘liberated areas’).  
Afghanistan had also become somewhat of a cause célèbre across the Western and 
Islamic world, drawing a multitude of NGOs and philanthropists.12  UN agencies such as 
UNHCR had had a prominent role in the refugee camps, but the UN response expanded 
suddenly in 1988 after the signing of the Geneva Accords that led to the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989.   
The war in Afghanistan led to staggering levels of mine contamination.  Soviet forces 
had engaged in a massive mining campaign, littering the Afghan/Pakistan border areas 
with thousands of aerially dispersed butterfly mines. They also laid both anti-vehicular 
                                                 
12
 Coll, S.. (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, From the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10, 2001. London, Penguin Books; Crile, G. (2004) Charlie Wilson’s War. New 
York, Grove Press; Rubin, B.R. (2002) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. 2nd Ed. New Haven, Yale 
University Press; Terry, F. (2002) Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Ithaca, 
New York, Cornell University Press. pp. 55-82; Harrison, S. S. (1990) “Afghanistan.” After the Wars: 
Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Indochina, Central America, Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. Lake, 
A. (Ed.). Washington DC, Overseas Development Council; Baitenmann, H. (January 1990) “NGOs and the 
Afghan War: The Politicisation of Humanitarian Aid.” Third World Quarterly. 12(1); Wilson, C. (October 
1989) “Continue U.S. Aid to Afghanistan.” The World & I. 
11 
and anti-personnel mines to block key roads. Having developed their mine warfare 
doctrine in the struggle against WWII German invasion, the scale and density of these 
minefields was completely out of proportion and entirely inappropriate for countering a 
unconventional guerilla force. The mujahideen too used both improvised and imported 
mines to harass Soviet troop movements and protect ‘liberated areas.’13 While demining 
had always been considered a military issue, the high casualty rates and socio-economic 
blockages caused by mines became too big to ignore.  
The following three subsections will outline how the three key humanitarian actors in 
Afghanistan – USAID, NGOs and the UN – reacted to the mine threat and shaped the 
development of the Afghan mine action program. 
 
2.1.1. USAID, RONCO and the Mine Detection Dog Center, 1988-1994 
US support to demining in Afghanistan developed in the context of the above 
mentioned USAID Cross-Border Humanitarian Assistance Program (CBHA), which 
smuggled aid from Pakistan into “liberated [mujahideen controlled] regions” of 
Afghanistan.14  While cloaked in language of humanitarianism, the CBHA was closely 
integrated with the CIA effort supporting the mujahideen.  Though the CBHA did not 
provide weapons, it provided ‘nonlethal’ assistance that was vital to the mujahideen war 
effort. Indeed, the CIA and USAID shared the same local counterpart, the Pakistani Inter-
Service Intelligence (ISI), which made the key decisions about “who got what” 
assistance, both overt and covert.15  USAID, the CIA and the ISI, as the CBHA director 
Larry Crandall said, “were just one big happy family.”16 
Since supplies and logistics were key strategic priorities for the mujahideen, one of 
the first things Crandall did was distribute “hundreds of brand-new Isuzu and Toyota 
trucks” to the top Afghan commanders.17  However, USAID soon discovered that trucks 
were difficult to drive over the mountains, especially in winter, and so also imported 
1,850 mules from Missouri, Tennessee and Arkansas.  Flown in “under the cover of 
night,” the mules were distributed to the mujahideen, under the careful watch of the ISI.18  
                                                 
13
 For more details about the landmine situation in Afghanistan see: Survey Action Center. (2006) 
Landmine Impact Survey – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Takoma Park, MD, Survey Action Center.  For 
details of how the landmine situation developed, see also:  Monin, L. & Gallimore, A. (2002) The Devil’s 
Gardens: A History of Landmines. London, Pimlico. pp. 162-163, 171; Croll, M. (1998) The History of 
Landmines. Barnsley, UK, Leo Cooper. pp. 125-126; Roberts, S. & Williams, J. (1995) After the Guns Fall 
Silent: The Enduring Legacy of Landmines. Washington, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation; US 
Defense Intelligence Agency. (1988) “Mine Warfare in Afghanistan: A Defense Research Assessment.” 
88-DIA-0438 8G. Document 39223, Afghanistan Extras Unpublished Collection, Box 3, Folder 1986, 
George Washington University National Security Archive.  
14
 USAID. (24 October 1988) “A.I.D. Strategy: Afghan Resettlement and Rehabilitation.” Development 
Experience Clearinghouse. Document PN-ABR-629. <http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNABR629.pdf>. p. 
7; USAID. (1 June 1989) “Afghanistan: Briefing for the Deputy Administrator-designate.” Development 
Experience Clearinghouse. Document PN-ABR-629. <http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNABR629.pdf>. p. 
3-4. 
15
 Mahan, V. (16 August 2006). Personal interview with author in Virginia, USA. 
Crandall, L. (1 July 2006) Personal interview with author in McLean, Virginia, USA. 
16
 Crandall 2006. cf. Lohbeck, K. (1993) Holy War, Unholy Victory: Eyewitness to the CIA’s Secret War in 
Afghanistan. Washington DC, Regnery Gateway. p. 92. 
17
 Crile 2004, pp. 367, 369. 
18
 Mahan 2006; Local NGO Worker (6 November 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul, 
Afghanistan;  Hayter, D. (April 2003) “The Evolution of Mine Detection Dog Training.” Journal of Mine 
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Officially, these mules were for transporting humanitarian cargo, “But no one bothered to 
tell the mujahideen at the border that they might be violating [US]AID rules by adding a 
mortar or box of AK ammo to the load.”19 As Crandall explained: 
We weren’t interested in all the handholding, this was serious business.  This was defeat the 
Soviets on their own territory and bloody their nose, and make their military lose confidence the 
same way our military lost confidence after Vietnam.  This was tit for tat….  That’s really what 
was going on, all this missionary crap…we didn’t have time or inclination for it….20 
 
As the Soviets began to pay more attention to interdicting supplies and infiltration 
from Pakistan, Crandall began to realize that the mines they laid posed a significant threat 
to his logistical system.  Crandall later explained,  
You bring a mule all the way from Tennessee, you train a guy, you deploy that mule and 
you’ve got several thousand dollars of investment there right away. And if the first time it walks 
across the border into Afghanistan it steps on a landmine and blows its leg off, it’s useless, you’ve 
got to shoot it.  So we were equally interested in clearing the trails [into Afghanistan].21   
 
Therefore, in his budget request for 1989, Crandall requested funding for a demining 
program.22  It was approved and though Soviet troops began their withdrawal in early 
1989, the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul clung stubbornly to power and the CBHA 
continued, as did the CIA effort. 
The new demining program was run by RONCO Consulting Corporation, the 
contractor responsible for operating the whole procurement and logistical pipeline for the 
CBHA from 1989 onwards – a contract worth $31 million.23 RONCO was also involved 
in importing the previously mentioned mules, and ran an Animal Holding Facility in 
Peshawar, Pakistan to train them and “teach the Afghans to load, handle, and care for the 
animals.”24  Dr. John Ottenburg, manager and veterinarian of the Animal Holding 
Facility and a former US Army colonel, had earlier been involved in a joint US and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Action. Issue 7.1. <http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/7.1/features/hayter/hayter.htm>; RONCO. (1 February 
1990) “Quarterly Report: Commodity Export Program Afghanistan: AID REP Project No. 306-0205-C-00-
9384-00, October 1, 1989 through December 31, 1989.” Available from USAID Development Experience 
Clearinghouse. Document PD-ABJ-491. rcr12-3; USAID 1989b, p. 8; Pertman, A. (18 February 1989) 
“Gorbachev Asks US to Halt Afghan Aid; $250m Nonmilitary Effort Detailed.” The Boston Globe. p. 1; 
Hayter 2003. 
19
 Crile 2004, p. 370. Use of mules to carry ammunition confirmed by: Local NGO Worker 2006. 
20
 Crandall 2006. 
21
 Crandall 2006. 
22
 USAID 1988, pp. 13-32. 
23
 RONCO. (1994) “USAID/Afghanistan Commodity Export Program (CEP) Contract No. 306-0205-C-00-
9384-00, March 1, 1989 through February 28, 1994: Final Report.” Available from USAID Development 
Experience Clearinghouse. Document PD-ABI-329. ; RONCO. (June 1998) “Humanitarian Demining: Ten 
Years of Lessons.” The Journal of Humanitarian Demining. Issue 2.2. 
<http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/2.2/field/ronco.htm>; USAID. (16 November 1989) “Briefing Book for the 
Visit of ANE/Assistant Administrator Carol Adelman: December 1-8, 1989.” Digital National Security 
Archives: Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990. <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>. p. 4; 
USAID. (May 1994) “Project Assistance Completion Report: Commodity Export Program (306-0205).” 
Available from USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse. Document PD-ABJ-204. pp. 4-6. 
24
 USAID 1989a, p. 8; USAID 1989b, p. 4; Buse, M. (June 2000) “RONCO Executives Talk About 
Demining, Integration and the IMAS Contract: (An Interview with Lawrence Crandall, Stephen Edelmann 
and A. David Lundberg).” Journal of Mine Action. Issue 4.2. 
<http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/4.2/Features/ronco/ronco.htm>; Hayter 2003. 
Local NGO Worker 2006. 
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Royal Thai Army program using dogs to demine along the Cambodian border and 
suggested USAID use such dogs in Afghanistan.25  Using dogs would be more 
appropriate than traditional bulky military demining machines that would have attracted 
enemy attention and been difficult to transport through the mountains.   
 
Figure 1: RONCO Animal Holding Facility Commemorative Plate. Kabul, Afghanistan, 2006. 
 
 
 
With the assistance of the CIA station in Bangkok, Crandall persuaded the Thai 
military to help train the mujahideen in demining.26  In what Crandall later called “a 
covert operation,”27 RONCO flew 14 German shepherd dogs and their Thai Army 
handlers to Pakistan.  Though it was tough to overcome the “Thai-English-Pashto 
language barrier,” RONCO trained 12 Afghan and two Pakistani handlers at its Animal 
Holding Facility and deployed them in early 1989.  In a pilot effort, they cleared 
“approximately 137 kilometers of road leading into the town of Urgun, Patika province.  
Approximately 734 mines were removed or blown in place.”28  The mujahideen 
commander in that area, Haji Zarbad, escorted the team in and out of the country and 
provided them with food and accommodation; he now continues to work with the mine 
dog program.29 USAID was impressed, calling the pilot a “huge success.”30  
Later that year, RONCO, with a Texan dog training company called Global Training 
Academy, set up the Afghanistan Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC) in Risalpur, 
Pakistan.  This was the first time the US had contributed to the creation of a civilian mine 
action capacity. Trainee handlers would receive an eight week course at a facility 
provided by the Pakistani Army in Risalpur and then be deployed to Afghanistan for two 
out of three months, returning every third month for a refresher course. By April 1991, 
                                                 
25
 Crandall 2006; Hayter 2003; Buse 2000; RONCO 1998. 
26
 Crandall 2006. 
27
 In Buse 2000. 
28
 USAID 1989c, Tab P; Safi, M. (31 October 2006) Personal interview with author in Kabul, Afghanistan.   
29
 Local NGO Worker 2006. During this interview, the author also met Haji Zarbad. 
30
 USAID 1989c. 
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RONCO reported that its teams had destroyed “in excess of 3,000 explosive devices” 
while clearing “736km of roads and two airstrips.”31  
The US continued to support the MDC directly through RONCO until 1994.  There 
had been efforts to turn it over to UN control but the UNOCHA Afghanistan coordinator, 
Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, an animal rights activist, had objected to the use of dogs in 
such a dangerous operation to clean up a human-caused problem.32  However, in addition 
to providing dog teams to RONCO’s local logistics partner agency,33 the MDC 
surreptitiously coordinated its efforts with the UN operation until Aga Khan left.34  The 
MDC was then reorganized as an NGO and incorporated into the fold of the UN program 
(described below).  The MDC is now the biggest mine detection dog NGO in the world.35 
 
Figure 2: MDC Dog Trainer at Work. Kabul, Afghanistan, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
Because it was set up just as US interest in Afghanistan began to decline, MDC did 
not become as politicized as it possibly might have if the Cold War had continued.  MDC 
fairly quickly became a relatively depoliticized part of the larger UN program.  However, 
its roots lie in the logic of US covert action in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  While 
ostensibly a humanitarian program, it also acted in support of a paramilitary campaign, 
and was run by a commercial company which was motivated at least somewhat by profit.  
There is no doubt that the early US funding for demining saved lives, but it also benefited 
the logistics capacity and political credibility of the mujahideen. 
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2.1.2. The HALO Trust, 1987-1994 
The many international NGOs involved in providing aid to the Afghans in the 1980s 
were also fully aware of the threat mines and UXO posed both to their own workers and 
the people they served, and began seeking ways to mitigate it.  The International 
Committee of the Red Cross, which was running hospitals for war wounded, provided 
medical care and developed prosthetics for mine accident survivors.36  Handicap 
International also worked with mine survivors both in Afghanistan and in the refugee 
camps in Pakistan.37 Several international NGOs also began incorporating mine 
awareness education into other programs like health and education. In early 1988, despite 
accusations of imprudence from other NGOs, Rae McGrath, then country director of 
World Vision International and former British serviceman, organized one of the first 
NGO-implemented mine clearance programs in the context of rural rehabilitation project 
in Chamkani, Paktia province.38 He then set up Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a British 
NGO, with the purpose of assisting the UN in developing a mine clearance program in 
Afghanistan (see next section). 
However, only one international NGO, the Hazardous Area Life-support Organisation 
(HALO) Trust actually developed a sustained, long-term mine clearance program in 
Afghanistan.  Now one of the largest demining organizations in the world, indeed one of 
the biggest charities based in Britain, the HALO Trust is a little out of place among 
traditional ‘civil society’ groups, as it was begun by ex-British Army officers Colin 
Mitchell and Guy Willoughby. Both of them had worked in Afghanistan and were 
shocked at the humanitarian impact of mines.  They felt that rather than leaving it to the 
military, demining ought to be “an act of charity.”39   It has maintained a reputation of 
prickly independence and paramilitary discipline that is reflected in the personalities and 
careers of its founders. 
 
Figure 3: HALO Trust Compound. Kabul, Afghanistan, 2006. 
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In 1987, Mitchell and Willoughby decided to set up the HALO Trust to help mitigate 
the humanitarian impact of the Afghan war.  As former soldiers, they were interested in 
the ways they could put their military knowledge to use for civilian and humanitarian 
benefit.  Demining seemed an obvious choice.40  However, since the idea of an NGO 
getting involved in a ‘military issue’ was so radical – press articles from the time called it 
a “bizarre”41 and “quixotic mission”42 – they decided to start with small and tangential 
projects.  Following an assessment in June and July 1988, they recruited a Kabuli doctor, 
Farid Homayoun, and set up an office in Shar-e-Naw, in the town center of communist-
controlled Kabul.43  Throughout 1988 and 1989, HALO provided mine awareness 
briefings to the expatriate community in Kabul and ran maternal and child health clinics 
in the city, in partnership with UNICEF and the Afghan Red Crescent.  With ex-British 
Army volunteers, many of whom learned mine-clearing in the Falklands War, HALO 
began its nascent demining program by responding to explosive ordnance disposal needs 
at the German and Japanese embassies and Hoechst Pharmaceutical Co. in 1989.44 
Their major breakthrough came when they were able to obtain Soviet minefield 
records given to the Afghan government when Soviet troops withdrew in early 1989.45 
While these were later found to be rather inaccurate, persuading the Kabul government to 
allow a Western NGO to photograph secret Soviet military documents signaled the 
beginning of a significant shift in thinking about the mine problem as a humanitarian 
rather than military issue. By the end of 1989, the New York Times was describing Guy 
Willoughby and another Englishman, Paul Jefferson, working their way through 
minefields in Pul-e-Khumri in a pilot project intended “to test the accuracy of Soviet 
mine maps and to show the Afghan Army’s engineering corps how the job is done.”46  
HALO then began planning to scale up their operation, approaching the nascent UN 
demining program for funding. 
In the politically charged context following the Soviet withdrawal, HALO’s program 
aroused suspicions and contradictory rumors made the rounds. Some agencies cast a 
disapproving eye on the fact that HALO was the only demining group, and one of very 
few western NGOs, that coordinated its efforts with the communist government.  This 
was seen by some as ‘aiding the enemy.’  “Our job is to get things going and to save 
lives, rather than dithering about the politics of giving aid to the regime of President 
Najibullah,” said Willoughby. “There may be 20,000 Communists, but there are over one 
million displaced people in Kabul alone who need our help.”47 However, despite any 
concerns the UN might have had about HALO, it was the only demining agency working 
the communist-controlled part of Afghanistan.  The US-supported MDC and the UN-
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created NGOs only worked in the mujahideen-controlled regions.  Therefore, the UN 
made its first contract with HALO in 1990 and HALO has continued to be a UN 
implementing partner ever since.  It has since grown into the biggest demining agency in 
Afghanistan, with some 2,800 staff. 
 
2.1.3. Operation Salaam and the UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme, 1988-1994 
In 1988, the US and USSR signed the Geneva Accords, aimed at ending hostilities in 
Afghanistan and preparing the way for a Soviet withdrawal, which occurred in 1989.  
Anticipating a large scale return of refugees to Afghanistan, the UN Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) launched a massive program of 
assistance, dubbed Operation Salam, under the supervision of a former UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan.48 
The early haphazard and misguided UN efforts to deal with the mine problem show 
just how new and unprecedented the idea of a humanitarian mine clearance program was.  
Following an initial assessment and development of a curriculum by a survey team of 
military personnel from France, Turkey, the UK and USA, a Mine Clearance Programme 
was established within Operation Salaam.49  By the end of 1989, military personnel from 
Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, the USA and UK had 
trained 13,827 Afghan refugee volunteers to “return to their homes and begin to clear 
their areas of mines.”50  However, this effort failed, marked by “a good deal of confusion 
… lack of communication … [and] lack of planning at all levels.”51 Firstly, because “The 
envisaged large scale repatriation of Afghan refugees…did not occur.”52 Secondly, and 
more importantly, the lack of any supervisory or regulatory framework seems to have led 
to shoddy work and bad accidents.53 
After a “radical rethink,”54 UNOCHA decided to develop a formal and specialized 
institutional structure to coordinate and implement demining in Afghanistan. UNOCHA 
would fund, coordinate and supervise the program, and provide expatriate technical 
advisors to several local Afghan-run NGO implementing partners,55 through an office 
called the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA) based in Pakistan.  
Martin Barber, a senior officer in Operation Salam at the time and later head of the UN 
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Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in New York, explained that this decision was made 
because the UN wanted to keep the program out of the sphere of political contestation 
until a government recognized by the majority of the international community and 
Afghan people sat in Kabul: 
The UN system as a whole had really adopted the NGOs as an alternative to working with 
local government…. We didn’t want to carve it out for international commercial companies to 
make a lot of money out of, even if those companies had been willing to work in the context of 
Afghanistan as it then was, which, frankly I don’t think they would have.56 
 
 
Figure 4: OMAR deminers on 'TV Hill.' Kabul, Afghanistan, 2006. 
 
 
 
The responsibilities of these NGOs, founded between 1990 and 1993 and funded 
through UNOCHA grants, were divided by technical specialty and region.  The Mine 
Clearance and Planning Agency (MCPA) surveyed and mapped the mine problem, and 
made estimates of the labor and time needed to clear specific areas.  Manual and 
mechanical clearance programs were set up by Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) in 
east and central Afghanistan, and the South West Afghan Agency for Demining 
(SWAAD) in the southwest.  After “internal management problems,” SWAAD was 
reformed and renamed the Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) in 1993.57  The 
Organization for Mine Awareness (OMA) worked to educate both refugees and people 
still living in Afghanistan about the mine and UXO problem.  In August 1992, OMA took 
on mine clearance tasks to cover western Afghanistan, overlooked up until that point, and 
changed its name to the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation 
(OMAR) in 1993. Northern Afghanistan was left to the HALO Trust.   These NGOs, and 
UNOCHA, their supervisor and funder, were known collectively as the UN Mine Action 
Program for Afghanistan (MAPA). 
                                                 
56
 Barber 2006. 
57
 UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme. (30 June 1993) “Mid Year Report.” Document PC-AAA-510. 
USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse. 
19 
Unlike the US program, the UN claimed “Neutrality” as a key aspect of the program.58 
In the beginning this was not entirely true.  The early expatriate military officers 
seconded to the program were from non-Communist states and were interested in 
learning about Soviet mine warfare.59 The UN training camps were set up and run by the 
Pakistani Army, the ISI bussed prospective deminers, recruited from the Pakistan-based, 
Pashtun-dominated mujahideen parties, to the training camps,60 and they were only sent 
to work in mujahideen-controlled areas of Afghanistan.  Moreover, some of the Afghan 
NGOs, for a time, were associated with political factions.61  
However, as the “The uncertain security situation” became one of the “major 
constraints in the efficient implementation of the mine clearance programme” 62 and the 
communist government fell in 1992, the MAPA managed, perhaps out of necessity, to 
establish a non-partisan reputation among the mujahideen parties that began to fight for 
the remains of the Afghan state.  Especial effort, largely successful, was made to 
disassociate the NGOs from political parties. By the end of 1994, the MAPA had cleared 
over 32,000 mines and 24,000 UXO from over 75 million square meters of land.63 
2.2. UN Hegemony, 1994-2001 
While in the early years there were several alternative models of responding to the 
Afghan mine problem, it was the UN-led, NGO implemented model that eventually 
became ascendant in Afghanistan.  Indeed, Mohammed Sediq, now UNMACA chief of 
operations points to the “very strong” coordination mechanisms” as a root of the 
MAPA’s success.64 This section outlines how the UN demining program achieved its 
hegemonic position between 1994 and 2001. 
After the Communist government in Kabul fell in 1992, and the threat of the USSR 
disappeared with the end of the Cold War, the US lost interest in Afghanistan as a 
strategic priority.  Therefore, the CBHA wound down rapidly and by 1994 had pulled out 
of Pakistan and Afghanistan completely.  By that time, Prince Agha Khan had left the 
UN program and so there was no objection on either the US or UN side to reorganize the 
MDC as a local NGO and incorporate it into the MAPA. The US continued to fund 
Afghan demining at a level of about $1-3 million a year from 1994 to 2001, but 
channeled and coordinated all its assistance through the MAPA.65  Unlike the partisan 
spirit of the CBHA, the MDC, like the other Afghan NGOs, “established a working 
relationship with all sides”66 in the ongoing conflict between the mujahideen parties. 
The HALO Trust, since it was largely funded through the UN system, also became 
subsumed under the MAPA umbrella, though it was “highly resistant to coordination by 
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UNOCHA.” 67  For many years HALO maintained its own separate survey capacity, 
rather than relying on the local NGO MCPA, like the rest of MAPA.  It also refused to 
coordinate its operations to include MDC’s dogs, because HALO did not trust the ability 
of dogs discover mines effectively.  However, an uneasy truce developed, analogous to a 
‘federal’ system, where HALO was under the MAPA umbrella, but had a degree of 
autonomy that the other, local mine action NGOs did not have. Thus from 1994 to 2001, 
the system remained largely unchanged and unchallenged.   
While the rise of the Taliban in 1997 posed some difficulties – for instance, the 
Taliban objected to the employment of women as mine awareness instructors and harshly 
persecuted some non-Pastun deminers – in the end, most mine action agencies had 
tolerable relations with them.  Security for deminers improved considerably as the 
Taliban cracked down on warlordism and violent crime.  The Taliban, like many 
Afghans, viewed demining as a continuation of the jihad against the Soviets and were 
largely supportive, even donating land to some of the NGOs.  The Taliban also used few 
mines, and in 1998 publicly backed a ban on them. The Northern Alliance, which were 
fighting a defensive war against the Taliban, did continue to use mines extensively, but 
they too were largely supportive of the demining program in areas of low strategic 
importance. 68  The MAPA’s perceived neutrality was critical in maintaining its ability to 
work extensively all over the country.  Expressing a sentiment that most Afghan mine 
action personnel hold, Dr. Farid of HALO Trust said, “The important thing is to keep 
neutrality, so you are not seen as pro this or against that group. That’s the key thing, 
having a neutral, impartial humanitarian organization.”69  However, as the Taliban and 
their Al Qaeda sponsors faced international rebuke following the bombings of US 
embassies in East Africa in 1998, and subsequent US missile strikes on Afghanistan, the 
program stagnated somewhat, struggling to finding funding. 
The streamlining, increased coordination and economies of scale that came from 
running the program under one umbrella seemed have some payoff, with a trebling of 
minefield area cleared between 1991 and 1999 (tailing off in the funding crisis of 1998-
2001) and a quadrupling of battle area70 cleared between 1994 and 2001.  While there 
was an upturn following the 1998 funding crisis, cost of clearance also showed a slow but 
discernable decline toward 50 cents per square meter of minefield cleared. 
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Figure 5: Trends in the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan, 1990-200171  
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However, the UN-led system was not without its problems and critics. 
First, many felt the system was far too rigid and that the UN controlled it too tightly.  
As mentioned above, the HALO Trust argued for and jealously guarded a degree of 
autonomy from the UN that the other agencies did not have.  Moreover, for several years 
the UN program implicitly discouraged the local NGOs from seeking external sources of 
funding.72  This was to ensure coordination and a streamlined system, but did little to 
develop the independent financial capacity of the local NGOs.  
Second, many have criticized the lack of competition in the system, or any strong 
incentives for NGOs to increase productivity.  While there were several NGOs, they did 
not compete against each other for funding as tasks were divided largely on the basis of 
geography or technical service provided.  As the academic literature on the political-
economy of rent-seeking has suggested,73 a lack of competition in provision of public 
services can lead to waste, misallocation and even abuse of resources. Thus concerns of 
petty corruption or waste of resources have occasionally been raised by people concerned 
that the MAPA played into a rent-seeking polity.  Thus Harpviken noted in 2002 that the 
Afghan NGOs were “relatively weak in terms of accountability and corporate 
governance.”74 
Third, though recognizing that handing the demining program to the Taliban would 
have killed chances for international funding, some mine action experts felt 
uncomfortable that the program had remained in external, international, control for so 
long.  The headquarters of the UN program remained in Peshawar, Pakistan, and the top 
level management were all expatriates.  Several commentators hoped that when a stable 
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and internationally recognized government finally came to Kabul, the MAPA would be 
transferred to local control. 
Fourth, due to the international isolation of the Taliban regime, the UN found it 
difficult to grow the program.  Afghanistan had fallen off the strategic maps of the great 
powers and donors were reluctant to engage too deeply with an Islamist regime with 
close links to international terrorism.  The political climate in the aftermath of US missile 
strikes in 1998 made it especially difficult to secure funding (looking at the above graphs 
one can see evidence of stagnation or recession in the years between 1998 and 2001).  
Finally, some commentators felt the success of the demining program distracted from 
the international community’s failure to stop the root cause of the mine and UXO 
problem – the conflict itself.  They said demining was a way for the international 
community to ‘manage’ the effects, rather than a solution to the civil conflict and frame it 
as humanitarian rather than a political issue.75 
 
Figure 6:UNMACA Headquarters in Kabul. Kabul, Afghanistan, 2006. 
 
 
 
Despite these issues, the UN–led demining program achieved a great deal in an 
extremely difficult political context.  By the end of 2001, the MAPA had cleared over 
93,000 mines and nearly 820,000 UXO from over 632 million square meters of 
contaminated area.76 Moreover, clearance yielded significant economic benefits – a 
UNDP and World Bank study found a $91.5 million net benefit, a 47% return, from 
demining in 1999 alone.77 An earlier study with similar findings showed that almost 86% 
of demined land was being used productively.78  Thus Harpviken argued in 2002 that 
despite “a state of civil war … no functioning government, and … the mixed results 
gained in other sectors of assistance,” the Afghan demining program was, “a world leader 
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in its field” and “one of the best functioning sectors in economic and humanitarian 
assistance to the country.”79 
2.3. The 9/11 Sea Change 
After seven years of disengagement from the country, the tragic events of September 
11, 2001 put Afghanistan back on the US geo-political map.  Unlike in the 1980s, when 
the US mainly operated through Pakistani interlocutors from the safety of Islamabad, US 
agencies involved themselves directly in Afghan politics.  While they were relatively 
hands off in comparison to their participation in international regimes in Bosnia, Kosovo 
or Iraq, US involvement was unprecedented as far as Afghanistan was concerned.  The 
graphs below shows how US assistance in general, and demining assistance in particular, 
ramped up suddenly after 2002. 
 
Figure 7: US Aid to Afghanistan, General and Mine Action, 1991-2005.80 
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Other developed countries followed America’s lead, increasing their foreign aid 
contributions to Afghanistan substantially.  As one might expect, this led to the explosive 
growth of the MAPA. The following graph shows how quickly the program grew post-
9/11. 
 
Figure 8: Contributions to UN Mine Action, 1991-2005.81 
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At the same time, funding modalities for demining multiplied.  Before 2001, the 
majority of funding (with a few bilateral exceptions) was channeled through the UN trust 
fund.  After 2002, there was an increase in bilateral involvement, UNDP funded 
demining training for demobilized soldiers through NGOs, and UNOPS channeled 
money from the World Bank and USAID.  The staggering increase and diversification of 
funds led to demands for greater scrutiny over how funds were used and a shake up in the 
management of the demining program.  Donors and the UN were concerned that the 
Afghan NGOs did not have necessary the management and financial accounting capacity.  
Chris Stephens, program manager responsible for Afghanistan at the UN Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) in New York, said: 
The capacity of the NGOs had rapidly expanded in the operational sense, for instance, one of 
the NGOs went from 2000 people to 4000 people operationally, and the one thing that had not 
been effectively looked at during that process had been their back-office structures.82 
 
Therefore, the UN commissioned Price Waterhouse Coopers to conduct a major audit 
of the program in 2004, in order to identify weaknesses in the system and where to direct 
capacity building efforts.  As a result, the last five years have seen considerable reform of 
UNMACA and the Afghan NGOs.  In order to improve UNMACA’s understanding of 
the local situation and take the first step to great local control, UNMACA moved its 
headquarters from Peshawar in Pakistan to Kabul.  UNMACA increased the staffing of 
its program section to monitor the use of funds, tightened up NGO reporting requirements 
and embedded expatriate financial capacity building advisors within each of the Afghan 
NGOs.  The UN also cut off funds to a couple underperforming local NGOs, and 
eventually, following an attempt to reorganize it, incorporated the local NGO Monitoring 
Evaluation and Training Agency (META) into UNMACA itself.  Between 2003 and 
2004, MCPA in cooperation with the Survey Action Center, an American NGO, 
conducted a Landmine Impact Survey – a comprehensive study which ranked Afghan 
communities according to the human and socio-economic impact of landmines.  This is 
now used by UNMACA to better target and prioritize demining according to human 
need.83  Finally, in late 2006, a new UNMACA Chief of Staff, Kerei Ruru was brought in 
with an apparent mandate to overhaul and revitalize the organization. Chris Stephens of 
UNMAS noted in early 2007 some of the significant achievements of the MAPA’s recent 
reform: 
Fundamental changes have taken place. The change in the drills, one man-one lane, the 
increase in mechanical capacity, the shift of everyone to demining teams, the re-roling of the 
NGOs – they now all have their own organic survey capacity, MCPA is a clearance organization, 
MDC is providing subcontracted dogs across all the organizations so they have complete 
toolboxes, the NGOs have been restructured to not be across seven areas, but be across three, the 
internal levels of their organization have been reduced so that their headquarters elements have 
been reduced right down to ensure we have more funding going to meet demining teams.84 
 
Data suggests that the influx of resources and the reform efforts may have had impact 
on the productivity of the UN-led program. The area cleared annually increased steadily 
from 2003 onwards. Cost of clearance has risen however, perhaps partly as a result of the 
‘9/11 rent’ seen across most sectors of the Afghan economy.  The strategic value of 
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Afghanistan has risen, bringing with it the cost of land, labor and commodities. It is 
possible that this has had some inflationary pressure on the cost of clearance, which has 
doubled since 2001. 
 
Figure 9: Recent Trends in the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan, 2000-March 200685 
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Despite its efforts, US government agencies have not been fully satisfied with 
UNMACA’s reform. While welcoming the appointment of Kerei Ruru, USAID’s 
demining coordinator, Dean Hutson, said he saw UNMACA as “broken…a failed 
organization.”86 He said USAID’s main complaint was that UNMACA was not providing 
them with adequate reports and so he did not trust the quality control and quality 
assurance capacity of UNMACA.87  Initially, USAID channeled its funding for 
reconstruction demining through the UN system and RONCO was contracted by the State 
Department to build the capacity of the Afghan NGOs.  However, a parallel structure also 
began to emerge, with RONCO contracted by the military to demine bases and by the 
State Department to dispose of excess and captured munitions.88 RONCO’s return to 
Afghanistan presaged the growing commercialization of demining from 2005 onwards, 
outlined in section 3. 
2.4. Summary 
In sum, the origins of Afghan demining offered three alternative models of organizing 
demining: 
1) Demining in support of broader US security objectives, contracted through a 
private company (the RONCO/MDC program), 
2) International NGO mine action claiming political neutrality (the HALO 
Trust), 
3) UN coordinated mine action, implemented by local NGOs and also claiming 
political neutrality (the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan). 
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From 1994 till 2001, the third model was ascendant and the UN’s position as the 
leader of Afghan mine action remained relatively unchallenged.  However, as will be 
described in the following sections, US re-engagement in Afghan politics after 9/11 has 
seen the reappearance of the first model – a significant challenge to the established 
institutional structure of mine action. 
3. The Commercialization Process 
3.1. RONCO Returns 
After an eight year absence, RONCO returned to Afghanistan in 2002, asked by the 
US State Department to assist military engineers in demining Bagram and Kandahar air 
bases.  Moreover, said a RONCO publicist, “Based on its closely integrated operations 
with the U.S. Army, RONCO was also tasked with developing and training the first 
MDD [Mine Detection Dog] teams deployed in the U.S. Army since Vietnam.”89  It made 
sense for the US to bring in commercial capacity for such tasks, to avoid distracting 
humanitarian deminers from their priorities by tasking them with military demining. 
 
Figure 10: RONCO Deminers at Kabul International Airport. Kabul, Afghanistan, 2006. 
 
 
 
RONCO also worked outside the military bases, but this too fit within the broader 
strategic objectives of the US government.  For instance, since “securing stores of 
ammunition has been a high priority for Afghan and U.S. forces” in order to deny 
ordnance to the insurgency, RONCO developed Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
teams for “clearing up strike areas and ammunition dumps for the U.S. State Department 
and the Afghan government.”90  RONCO cites the following anecdote as one of its 
success stories: 
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When the coalition airfield at Kandahar came under numerous rocket attacks in early 2004, 
regional authorities requested RONCO deploy its teams to clear up munitions sites in the area 
surrounding the base. Clearance operations lasted five months, and since their completion, there 
have been no significant rocket attacks.91 
 
However, until 2005, commercial demining was limited to RONCO’s assistance to 
the military and a State Department contract to build the capacity of the existing UN-led 
system.  RONCO “chose not to implement sweeping changes and instead worked to 
improve pre-existing Afghan demining elements, coordinating their work and bringing 
them up to the level of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).”92  Much of 
their effort was aimed at improving the work of DAFA, which has gone from having a 
poor quality record to one of the best, as displayed by the following graph showing the 
results of quality assurance inspections on their sites: 
 
Figure 11: The Impact of RONCO's Capacity Building on the Quality of DAFA's Demining in the 
Central Area93 
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3.2. The Commercial Influx 
RONCO lost its position as the sole commercial demining company in Afghanistan in 
2004, when the UNMACA decided to allow accreditation of commercial companies 
interested in military and commercial reconstruction tasks. It is possible that the inflation 
of the cost of demining (the possible ‘9/11 rent’ shown in figure 9 above) made 
commercial companies sit up and notice the potential for profit in Afghanistan.  Allowing 
commercial operators to do demining tasks for the military made a great deal of sense, as 
using Afghan NGOs would distract them from their humanitarian priorities.94  However, 
the decision to allow them to do civilian reconstruction tasks met with more controversy. 
The rationale usually given by UNMACA and donors was that the new Afghan NGO 
Law forbade NGOs from bidding directly on commercial reconstruction tasks.95  
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However, some have argued that this problem could be circumvented by donors 
channeling money for demining as separate grants coordinated with reconstruction work 
(rather than commercial tenders) through the UN system.  Perhaps a more likely reason is 
that there was dissatisfaction among some donors about the dysfunctions in the MAPA 
and the lack of competitive and transparent bidding processes.  Developing a commercial 
sector was one way to encourage reform. 
 
Figure 12: S3AG Armored Bulldozers. Kabul, Afghanistan, 2006. 
 
 
 
Since 2005, six international commercial demining companies have flooded into 
Afghanistan.  Further commercialization looks likely, as USAID decided in July 2006 
that it would no longer channel its money through the UN to the local NGOs, but would 
simplify the process by having the prime contractor (such as Louis Berger Group) 
subcontract needed tasks to commercial demining companies.  While the US State 
Department continues to fund and provide technical assistance to the Afghan NGOs 
through its capacity building grant (which RONCO lost to the private security firm 
DynCorp in 2005), part of this program’s emphasis has shifted to assisting the local 
Afghan NGOs to spin off commercial operations.96 A major argument in favor of this is 
the diversification of funding for local demining, which up until recently has relied on the 
UN – a pot of money that some say threatens to dwindle in coming years.  Therefore, 
Dean Hutson of USAID argues that it is important that local demining organizations learn 
to compete for funding. 
It has forced them now to be business entities, which is probably the end state that we want to 
see anyway.  We don’t want this to be a non-stop, continuing welfare operation where we just 
hand out money to do it.97 
 
Therefore, one could argue that commercialization will create a more sustainable 
system, allowing local demining groups to learn to stand on their own feet, and begin, 
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through experience and partnerships with international companies, to compete in the 
international market. Expressing a view that fits with USAID’s overall strategy of 
encouraging private sector-led economic development in Afghanistan,98 USAID 
demining coordinator Dean Hutson said: 
We don’t want to babysit this country for the next twenty years, we want this country to stand 
up on its own, with its own business, its own private enterprise. … [We want to say] here’s the 
money, compete for this, do business for this, work for this, think for it, you know, not just kind of 
hanging off the government dole out there, waiting for it, but to actually put together your own 
businesses and make something of the country.99 
 
At the time of the author’s fieldwork in late 2006, ATC director Kefayatullah Eblagh 
had set up the company Hemayatbrothers International Demining (HID) and had been 
subcontracted by the company UXB International to provide labor.  OMAR director 
Fazel Karim Fazel was considering reviving a long dormant commercial operation 
OMAR International, registered in Dubai.  At the same time, all the Afghan NGO 
directors were setting up a commercial Afghan Demining Group (ADG), employing 
unemployed deminers and under the leadership of an independent director.  At the time 
of writing, it was expected that as ADG becomes operational, HID will fold into it or 
along with OMAR International bid only on contracts outside Afghanistan.  While the 
initial agreement is that profits will be reinvested into ADG, it is still unclear how profits 
will be distributed once it is no longer necessary for ADG to expand. 
In what has the potential to be a major boost to local commercial companies, the US 
State Department has agreed to allow equipment that it has donated to local NGOs for 
use by local commercial companies, if the NGOs have a surplus of equipment.100  At the 
time of the author’s fieldwork, other donors were still considering whether to allow this.  
However, UNMACA Chief of Staff said, “it doesn’t look likely” that there will be a 
surplus of equipment, so the decision may have little impact anyway.101 
3.3. Market Profile 
Because of the bewildering array of clients, publicity restrictions on defense 
contracts, and the tight-lipped posture of some of the companies, it is very difficult to 
estimate the size of the commercial market.  Based on commercial companies’ self-
reporting of revenue and/or output, the author estimates total revenue from commercial 
demining in 2006 was around $15 to 20 million.  The increase in the value of demining, 
possibly due to the ‘9/11 rent’ mentioned previously, has made commercial demining 
viable. However, it is not quite a ‘goldmine’; profit margins were fairly slim, with Bob 
Gannon of RONCO saying, “if you can make 10% you are doing well.”102 
At the time of writing, there were seven international commercial companies involved 
in mine action and three local start-ups.  RONCO is, at the moment, the largest company. 
A list and description of the other commercial companies involved in Afghanistan is in 
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the Annex to this report.  Excluding at least 250 Bosnian, Mozambican and Zimbabwean 
deminers employed at Bagram airbase (the number of which has been difficult to 
ascertain), the author estimates that the commercial sector employed at least 50 
expatriates (mostly British, American, Australian, South African and Zimbabwean) and 
1,000 Afghans in 2006.103   
In September 2006, USAID awarded a five year $1.4 billion energy, water and 
transportation infrastructure contract to Louis Berger Group, Inc. and Black & Veatch 
Special Projects Corp104 and in February 2007, posted a Notice of Intent to issue a 
Request for Applications for a further $400 million to construct “Strategic Provincial 
Roads” in South and East Afghanistan – those areas most affected by insurgencies.105 It is 
understood that a sizable portion of both these contracts will be sub-contracted for 
demining and battle area clearance.  This was followed in late March with the 
announcement that RONCO had won a $16.4 million three year contract to provide 
demining services to the US Army.106 Therefore, the commercial demining market is set 
to expand considerably over the next few years. 
Interestingly, despite the US change in favor of commercialization, it does not seem 
that many other donor countries will follow. Impressed with UNMACA’s reform efforts, 
and seeing the need to fill the gap in funding to NGOs left by USAID, many donors have 
stepped into the breach.  “In fact,” said Chris Stephens of UNMAS, “we’ve seen in the 
last three to six months an increase in support of the UN-led process.”107 
3.4. Summary 
Starting with RONCO in 2002 and widening with an influx of companies from 2005 
onwards, a range of private for-profit actors have entered the demining market in 
Afghanistan, mostly working on tasks for the Coalition forces.  While these have largely 
been international companies, nascent Afghan commercial entities have begun to form. 
The following sections will examine the record of this new demining commercial sector, 
in comparison with the international and local NGOs. 
4. Price and Productivity 
It has become conventional wisdom that contracting out public services increases 
competition and thus leads to improvements in efficiency and price. In many cases this is 
indeed true.108  This assumption has also been prevalent in the mine action sector,109 
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where a significant portion of mine clearance is contracted to commercial companies. 
Indeed, according to one study, “the mine action sector is probably the most 
commercialised sector of international humanitarian assistance.”110  
The logic behind commercial contracting seems to be borne out in Afghanistan by 
simple price comparisons given to the author anecdotally by interviewees. It is widely 
believed that commercial companies are able to conduct clearance at a lower price and 
faster than the UN-led system. Despite considerable efforts to attain it, the author was 
unable to get reliable data to allow for a broad country-wide comparison. Complicating 
factors include the difficulty of establishing comparability in the type of areas cleared and 
the absence of data separating the cost of NGO minefield clearance (which is much more 
expensive and time-consuming) from battle area clearance, .   
It is possible that a part of the impression that NGO clearance is slower and more 
expensive maybe partly due to commercials preferring simpler tasks. For example, 
because of liability concerns, some organizations are contracting commercial demining 
even when there is little chance of actual contamination.  Paul Molam of the 
British/Zimbabwe firm MineTech said, 
A lot of the work the commercials are doing, you know there’s nothing there, but before the 
[US Army] Corps of Engineers will allow a [construction] contractor onto an area, you’ve got to 
go and put your assets over the ground although you know there’s nothing there.111 
 
The below graphs show that in the last couple years local NGOs have been clearing a 
larger amount of ordnance from its tasks than commercials.  This can sometimes, though 
not always, be a rough proxy for the difficulty of a task. 
 
Figure 13: Comparing the 'Density' of NGO and Commercial Clearance Tasks112 
Mines Found per 10,000 Sqr Mtrs Cleared, 
January 2005-November 2006 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Local NGOs Intl NGOs Commercial (RONCO,
S3Ag & UXB)
 
Another indicator that commercial organizations may be doing simpler tasks is to 
look at the type of task completed. Battle area clearance (BAC), which is done in areas 
where there may be unexploded ordnance but little chance of mine contamination, is 
more easily mechanized, has less stringent safety regulations and can be completed faster 
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than minefield clearance.  The following graphs show that the commercial companies 
cleared much less minefield area than NGOs as a percentage of the total area they 
cleared: 
 
Figure 14: Type of Clearance Conducted as a Percentage of Total Area Cleared, by Organization 
Type.  January 2005 to November 2006. 113 
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That the commercials may be doing simpler tasks should not necessarily be taken as a 
criticism of them.  In fact, it may be a wise division of labor to focus commercial 
demining on tasks that can be done quickly and allow humanitarian NGOs to focus on 
slower, more difficult ones.  Moreover, getting NGOs to do tasks where there is minimal 
risk of contamination, such as those mentioned by Mowlam above, would be a waste of 
humanitarian resources. 
The only vaguely and comparable reliable data the author was able to obtain in order 
to compare costs was for clearance at Kabul International Airport.  The NGOs ATC and 
OMAR were clearing civilian areas of the airport while several commercial companies 
were clearing adjacent military areas.  Thus the terrain is similar, and on both sides, most 
of the contamination was from UXO rather than mines.  In this very limited case, NGO 
clearance was indeed significantly more expensive.  However, to make a generalization 
from this one particular place in a very large country, especially since the NGO clearance 
data was for the year prior to the commercial data, would be unwise.  Thus the following 
graph is shown only as a tentative illustration. 
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Figure 15: Tentative Price Comparisons between NGO and Commercial Clearance at Kabul 
International Airport 114 
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If the anecdotal and Kabul International Airport data on prices is correct, how were 
commercials able to achieve a lower price for demining while paying their staff as much 
as 50% more?  Some commercials have made some cost savings by streamlining 
administration or by not paying into a pension fund.  More importantly, commercial 
companies claim they have a higher speed of clearance. Commercial organizations argue 
that due to the profit motive, they use labor more efficiently and are more likely to use 
new technologies such as mechanical clearance. As Bob Gannon of RONCO said, “for a 
commercial company you get paid to do a job. The quicker you do that job, the better 
your profit is, the longer it takes you to do that job, the more it eats into your profit.”  He 
estimates that RONCO deminers probably work around three hours more in a work day 
than NGO deminers, due to fewer and shorter breaks and beginning the work day when 
deminers arrive on site, rather than when they leave the base camp.115 
Again, systematic comparison is difficult, as the author was not able to gain sufficient 
data to make comparisons between NGOs and commercials based on square meters 
cleared per work-hour.  The only comparison the author was able to make was using data 
from Kabul International Airport.  Note that this is may be specific to this particular 
location, and the NGO clearance data was for the year prior to the commercial data.  It 
does appear that some commercial companies were able to achieve a higher speed of 
clearance, but the following graph is far from conclusive. 
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Figure 16: Comparing the Speed of NGO and Commercial Clearance at Kabul International 
Airport116 
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Due to the lack of a larger dataset, one should take the price and speed data from this 
section with a very large grain of salt.  One must be careful about taking such statistics 
about the relative price and speed of commercial and NGO operations too seriously, 
because not all square meters cleared are alike.  Until there is better data collection by 
UNMACA, true comparison of like with like will be impossible. 
4.4. Summary 
From the admittedly rough data obtained by the author, it is possible that the 
commercial companies may have been able to clear areas of mines and UXO at a faster 
rate, and at a lower price than NGOs in Afghanistan.  However, at least a portion of this 
increased productivity and lowered price may be the result of commercial companies 
preference for battle area clearance and tasks that have fewer mines and UXO per square 
meter.  Better data gathering and analysis and UNMACA is needed on cost and speed of 
(especially commercial) clearance before proper comparisons can be made. 
 
Figure 17: Russian-made PMN-2 anti-personnel landmine. Kabul, Afghanistan, 2006 
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5. Specialization and Innovation 
In addition to the possibility of increased productivity and lowered prices, there are 
other, less quantifiable benefits from the influx of commercial actors.  By broadening the 
market, there is greater potential for different actors to specialize according to their 
respective comparative advantages.  If one company is particularly good at manual 
demining and another in canine demining, each can concentrate on excellence in their 
specific niche.  This gives added value to the client, who is then able to pick and choose 
specific service providers according to the needs of the task. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous sections, there is considerable logic in 
having commercial companies specialize on military demining, tasks with little risk of 
contamination and battle area clearance.  This would allow humanitarian demining to 
focus more carefully on high human impact demining, while still allow actors with other 
priorities to get demining done. 
Finally, the profit motive and drive to cut costs can spur innovation.  The commercial 
companies in Afghanistan are already more likely than the NGOs to adopt and use new 
detection and clearance technologies.  As these are tested in the field they can bring much 
needed technological progress to Afghan demining.  Since many of the commercial 
companies are multinational, with programs all over the world, they are far more likely to 
bring in knowledge and innovation developed outside of Afghanistan.  The local NGOs 
do not have as well developed international connections and so have more difficulty 
accessing the latest research and development. That said, international NGOs, such as 
HALO Trust and Danish Demining Group have also shown an ability to adopt new 
innovations. 
5.1 Summary 
The commercialization of demining in Afghanistan may bring three additional 
benefits that are less quantifiable than price and productivity: 
1) Specialization of organizations based on comparative advantage, 
2) Greater innovation due to the profit motive, 
3) Importation of knowledge and innovation developed outside Afghanistan. 
6. Quality and Safety 
While there may be benefits to commercialization, the author’s research has 
uncovered significant costs.  Most importantly, simple price comparisons do not take into 
account the human cost, in lowered safety, of contracting out potentially hazardous 
operations like demining – as one study on privatization said, “other values than 
efficiency are at stake.”117  Indeed, the larger literature on public service privatization has 
generally found that cost savings in contracting out often come with the risk of reduction 
in quality and/or safety.  The author’s investigations found this to be the case in Bosnian 
demining, where the drive for profit appeared to have created a strong incentive to cut 
corners and speed up the process in ways that made it more dangerous.118  Surprisingly, 
USAID, a major driver of commercialization, admitted they had not carried out any 
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studies to examine whether their move toward a tendering rather than a grant system 
would result in any reduction in safety.119 
While this problem can sometimes be solved by creating strong regulation systems, 
an effect of commercializing Afghan demining has been to erode the regulatory power of 
UNMACA.  UNMACA still has the power to take accreditation away from companies 
that fail to perform to the Afghanistan Mine Action Standards (AMAS), but it does not 
have the same kind of control over companies as it does over the NGOs, because it does 
not fund them.  Therefore, UNMACA has much fewer levers to impose conditionalities 
on companies.  This has been compounded by a lack of coordination between commercial 
organizations and the UNMACA. Though the UN says the situation is improving, until 
recently, many organizations that were contracting commercial demining did not think to 
include contract clauses requiring coordination with and submission of data to the 
UNMACA. UNMACA chief of operations, Mohammad Sediq said that coordinating the 
commercial companies has been “difficult” and that they are “not properly reporting to 
us.”120 
As a result, some commercial demining tasks were begun without UNMACA’s 
knowledge. Chris Stephens of UNMAS said, “There has certainly been multiple incidents 
where an organization will come us and say ‘we need a clearance certificate for our task 
that we have completed,’ because we have the responsibility for providing clearance 
certificates, and we will go, ‘What task?’”121  The author also overheard an expatriate 
commercial demining employee express confusion and incredulity about why he was 
required to have UNMACA inspectors visit the site, or have independent certification of 
clearance.   
Finally, UNMACA has difficulty keeping track of demining work on US military 
bases.  The Afghan nationals working as UNMACA’s quality assurance inspectors find it 
difficult to gain the security clearance to do spot checks. 122  The US military has its own 
mine action center based at Bagram that controls demining on US bases, but coordination 
and information sharing between them and UNMACA has been patchy.  Therefore, 
despite being the public body mandated by the Afghan government to be ultimately 
responsible for demining on Afghan territory, the Coalition bases have a parallel and 
stove-piped system. 
In sum, the commercial companies have been subject to far less oversight than the 
NGOs.  The following graph shows that in 2005 (the only year where complete quality 
assurance data was available at the time of the fieldwork) quality management 
investigation teams from the Central Area Mine Action Team did far fewer spotchecks on 
commercial companies than NGOs. 
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Figure 18: Level of Quality Assurance Surveillance over NGOs and Commercial Companies123 
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Even if there was a higher level of quality assurance inspection on commercials, at 
the time of writing, the quality assurance data had not been centralized and digitized.  It 
existed only as paper records in the Area Mine Action Centers (AMACs) – branch offices 
of UNMACA – out in the field.  Thus sophisticated analysis of a companies’ track record 
was difficult.  Chris Stephens of UNMAS said that centralizing and computerizing this 
data was a priority, but admitted: 
When the structure was set up, it was old school.  Communications were only through HF 
radio, you didn’t have internet out in the field, the NGOs didn’t have internet, etc. The problem is 
that we’ve had a carry over of that approach. … So we’re restructuring the infrastructure of the 
AMACs to increase the ability of them to digitally answer all the information flow requirements 
the UNMACA has.124 
 
It is important to note that many of the clients of commercial demining hire their own 
independent quality assurance personnel to maintain a level of supervision on the site.  
For instance, at a RONCO site visited by the author, the client’s expatriate quality 
assurance inspector was on the site all day.  It is possible then, that some commercial 
sites are under even greater scrutiny than the Afghan NGOs.  However, the problem with 
this system is that it is decentralized and privatized – there is no central repository 
comparable to UNMACA, where these private quality assurance personnel file their 
reports.  Indeed, the limited attempts by the author to obtain access to their reports were 
unfruitful.  Therefore, it is much more difficult to obtain information about the quality 
records of the companies than NGOs, creating what economists call ‘information 
asymmetries’ – information about the quality of work is not available to all potential 
clients.  The danger implicit in such market distortions in information are displayed in the 
following subsections, which show, using accident records and quality assurance reports, 
how commercial demining in Afghanistan appears to carry greater safety risks than 
demining by local and international NGOs. 
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6.1. Accident Records 
Analysis of demining accidents has suggested that in excess of 80% might be 
considered avoidable, caused by lack of proper management, supervision or training.125  
On this basis, a relatively poor safety record may be a proxy for poor quality demining.  
Consistent with the author’s findings in Bosnia,126 a comparison of accidents per area or 
ordnance cleared shows that commercial companies had a significantly poorer safety 
record in Afghanistan than international and local NGOs.  It is possible that this is due to 
the new arrival of commercial companies – it may take some time for them to get used to 
the conditions in Afghanistan.  However, it is also possible that the increased speed at 
which commercial demining companies have worked in Afghanistan has led to reduced 
safety. As one NGO director said, the commercial companies “are not magicians” and 
thus increased speed may come with a cost.127 The fact that USAID has decided to use 
commercial companies instead of NGOs in spite of this bad run of accidents is a cause for 
concern.  
 
Figure 19: Accident Record by Organization Type, January 2005 to November 2006 128 
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While accidents can serve as a good proxy for demining quality, they are still rather 
random and unpredictable events.  The data in the next subsection, which uses a direct 
measure of quality, suggests that the commercials’ poor accident record is unlikely to be 
simply bad luck. 
6.2. Quality Assurance Reports 
A key UNMACA supervisory mechanism is the teams of quality management 
specialists in each of its seven Area Mine Action Centers (AMACs) spread out across the 
country.  These teams carry out on-site quality assurance spot-checks on demining 
organizations as clearance is in process.  If the organization is in compliance with the 
appropriate mine action standards, they issue a Conformity Report.  If there are small 
infractions of the standards, they will issue a Minor Non-Conformity Report, indicating 
the errors observed and suggested ways to correct them.  For infractions that pose a direct 
threat to life – either a deminer’s or a future user of the land – the quality management 
team will issue a Major Non-Conformity Report. 
Unfortunately, at the time of the author’s fieldwork the Quality Assurance reports 
were not all centralized at UNMACA headquarters, due to the decentralized nature of the 
data collection and some technical problems setting up a central database.  Therefore, a 
country-wide comparison of quality assurance reports was not possible at the time of 
writing.  However, the author was able to obtain the paper records for 2005 and 2006 (till 
September) for the Central AMAC, which covers Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Bamyan, 
Wardak and Logar provinces.  The Central AMAC region is a good case study for 
comparison as some 36% of mine affected communities are located there129 and around 
42% of all demining and battle area clearance (in terms of square meters) in 2005 and 
2006 occurred there.130 Moreover, every demining actor, NGO and commercial, carried 
out demining and battle area clearance in this region in 2005 and 2006.  It is therefore 
probable that the Central AMAC is relatively representative of Afghan demining as a 
whole.  Moreover, the author believes this dataset to be the most reliable of the 
quantitative data used in this paper. 
The following graphs show the percentage distribution of Central AMAC Quality 
Assurance reports, by organizational type.  It shows that both in the Central region in 
general, and at the Kabul International Airport (as a smaller case study where NGOs and 
commercials worked in a similar location), commercial companies had a significantly 
higher rate of Major Non-Conformity.  That is, according to the Central AMAC quality 
management specialists, the commercial companies were more likely to engage in 
activities that could pose a direct threat to the lives of deminers or future users of cleared 
land:131 
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Figure 20: Distribution of Quality Assurance Reports by the Central Area Mine Action Center132 
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The quality inspection reports also suggest that the higher accident rates of 
commercials cited in the previous sub-section are not simply due to random coincidence.  
The below graphs indicate some correlation between major non-conformity rates and 
accident rates.  
 
Figure 21: The Effect of Major Non-Conformity with Standing Operating Procedures on Accident 
Rates, January 2005-September 2006133 
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It should be noted that what was true in general was not necessarily true in particular.  
For example, RONCO, a commercial company, had a better quality assurance record in 
the Central AMAC region than the average international NGO, and AREA (an NGO 
UNMACA cut off demining funding to in 2005) had a worse record than the average 
commercial company.134 
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Figure 22: Distribution of Quality Assurance Reports by the Central Area Mine Action Center135 
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It is also worth noting that though the Quality Assurance reports are a direct measure 
of quality, the spot-checks are administered by people and thus naturally risk problems of 
bias.  It is possible that due to their unfamiliarity with commercial companies and their 
often new techniques and mechanization, the quality management specialists judged them 
more harshly than the NGOs.  However, the margin of error due to human bias is reduced 
somewhat by the fact that there were 17 quality management teams doing checks in the 
Central region – not just one person. Therefore, it is possible that the bias of different 
teams may somewhat counterbalance each other. 
6.3. An Example of Commercial Corner-Cutting 
While the statistics on accidents and quality control non-conformity point to the 
possibility of corner-cutting in clearance activities, they only paint a broad picture.  
However, the author visited many demining sites, both NGO and commercial, in the 
greater Kabul region and was able to record on camera a particularly dangerous example 
of corner-cutting by an American company, called here Company X.  Company X was 
clearing a military area of Kabul International Airport on a NATO contract with the US 
Air Force.  They were new to Afghanistan, and had little in the way of assets – they had 
to rent personal protective equipment from another commercial company.  However, 
when interviewed, the company’s demining operations manager told the author that 
Company X was able to clear areas much quicker and more cheaply than the Afghan 
NGOs, even though they paid their deminers as much as 30% more.  He attributed their 
speed to effective use of mechanical technologies and the “motivation that a privately 
owned company has got.”  He assured the author that the increased speed did not come at 
a cost to safety, “because of the simple reason that all of our safety procedures, our 
standard operating procedures are set up specifically for mechanical clearance 
operations.”136 
However, when shown around their battle area clearance site, the author was shocked 
to find several life-endangering deviations from internationally recognized mine action 
standards.  Even more disturbingly, a report in the files of the Central AMAC outlined 
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observations of similar poor practice three or four months earlier.  For instance, on 3 
August 2006, the AMAC report observed, “Since the bulldozer machine which was busy 
in clearance of the task was un-armoured, it was unsuitable for mine clearance 
program.”137 
However, on 28 October 2006, the author took this picture of a Company X digger 
excavating a bunker in a battle area.  Note that despite the risk of there being unexploded 
ordnance buried in the ground being excavated, the digger’s cab is unarmored, the cab 
door is open, and the digger’s mechanic is hanging out of the door while the digger is in 
operation: 
 
Figure 23: Company X Battle Clearance at Kabul International Airport, 22 October 2006 
 
 
 
In the same August report, the Kabul AMAC team observed that “The relevant site 
supervisor and his colleagues were standing near the machine without PPE [Personal 
Protective Equipment] and maintaining safety distance.”138  On 24 November 2006, the 
author was told by the demining operations manager that the digger in the photograph 
below was excavating a suspected mine line.  He said it was highly unlikely that there 
were any mines there.  However, standard operating procedures still must be followed at 
all times.  Note that the digger, while this time armored, again has its door open, and the 
machines’ spotter, lacking a visor, is not wearing the required PPE. 
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Figure 24: Company X Mineline Clearance at Kabul International Airport, 24 November 2006 
 
 
 
While the author was told that UNMACA was investigating Company X’s safety 
procedures, the fact that it was able to continue operating with poor safety practices for so 
long indicates the lack of supervision and authority UNMACA had over Company X.  
While this case may be a particularly severe example, it shows that in the drive for speed 
and profit-making there is a danger that some companies, despite being new to the 
country and having less than ideal safety practices, can operate unhindered for a long 
time. 
6.4. Summary 
There is a danger that without proper control and oversight, the increased productivity 
and lower price of commercial demining compared with NGO clearance may come with 
a human cost – a loss of safety.  This is suggested a) by accident records, b) by quality 
control checks and c) by the case study of Company X.  That said, there are some 
exceptions, RONCO’s quality assurance record in the central region is, for instance, 
praiseworthy. 
The problems with commercial companies are not likely to be solved overnight, as 
the UNMACA’s quality assurance system is stretched and does not yet have a centralized 
data processing capability.  Thus sophisticated analysis and surveillance of non-
compliance with demining procedures is currently very difficult.  As a result, poor 
performing contractors may not be subject to the appropriate disciplines of regulation and 
competition.   
7. The Commodification of Demining 
Commercializing the market for demining in Afghanistan will likely lead to a 
corollary commodification of demining. The UNMACA system, implemented through 
NGOs, operates like a government public service.  Beneficiaries of demining do not pay 
for the service, and UNMACA claims prioritization is largely done on an assessment of 
need and the potential humanitarian and socio-economic benefits of mine clearance.  
Thus the beneficiaries’ ability to pay for the service should not be reflected in priorities, 
or the allocation of demining resources.  This system could be beneficial to the poor who 
could not afford the high price of clearing minefields that threatened their lives and 
livelihood.   
No visor Cab door open 
44 
UNMACA has drawn the criticism that is common of many public services, that its 
priority-setting was non-transparent, was occasionally influenced inappropriately and that 
it focused more on the processes of reconstructing destroyed infrastructure (which 
benefits those who were privileged to have infrastructure previously) than providing new 
infrastructure for the poor (which expands access to infrastructure).  However, despite 
these admittedly serious problems, there still existed elements of fairness in the 
distribution of demining resources – at least lip service to the allocation by need, not 
ability to pay.139  Moreover, the completion of the Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey 
in late 2005, which categorized communities according to the impact of landmines on 
public safety and socio-economic development, has allowed for more precise targeting of 
priorities.140 
The commercialization of demining changes this system.  By setting up a mixed 
market system, persons or organizations that want demining performed immediately no 
longer have to wait for higher priority tasks to be completed first.  If they have the ability, 
they can pay for demining, by a commercial operator, to occur immediately.  Demining 
has become a purchasable commodity.  For instance, the Afghan telecommunications 
company Roshan has unilaterally contracted demining with commercial companies.  The 
advantage is that this introduces flexibility into the system, and provides a two-track 
system, like the mixed public and private health care system in Britain.  Those who have 
money do not need to wait in line. 
 
Figure 25: HALO Trust Deminer at Work. Shomali Valley, Afghanistan, 2006. 
 
 
 
Since there is a surplus of trained deminers in the market, at this point there is not too 
much of a danger of the commercial market drawing significant human and physical 
resources away from the humanitarian demining system. In fact, the commercial capacity 
has soaked up some of the excess labor created by the UN-sponsored demobilization 
program that trained ex-soldiers to be deminers.141 However, since the commercial 
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operators pay more, there is a danger that the better quality people will be drawn away 
from the humanitarian sector and into the commercial sector – just as the commercial 
legal sector draws the best lawyers away from public defense offices in the US and 
Britain.  Thus there will be significant incentive for the best deminers to abandon the 
NGOs, redistributing the best talent to the commercial sector.  There has already been 
some bad feeling about this, one local NGO director complained that the commercials 
“steal the expertise” from the NGOs.142 Chief of staff Kerei Ruru said that while there has 
been “a wee bit” of “poaching of talent,” UNMACA will prevent this from continuing 
through “a gentleman’s agreement” that “can be enforced, because we’re the licensing 
body.”143 However, it is not necessarily certain that future UNMACA chiefs would honor 
this commitment. 
Moreover, if other donors pull their money out of the UN Voluntary Trust Fund, the 
UN’s control over the prioritization of demining could erode as bilateral donors pick 
priorities themselves and the UN is less able to afford a large staff.  This could lead to a 
loss of coordination and a distortion of demining priorities.  The UN’s ability to 
discipline contractors that pull human resources away from the humanitarian sector will 
also be reduced. 
Finally, the commodification of demining turns demining into a profitmaking activity 
rather than a public service.  Some observers have been disturbed by this idea, especially 
concerned that international commercial companies are repatriating profits out of 
Afghanistan, when there would be considerable benefit to reinvest that money in-country. 
For instance, MDC director Shohab Hakimi said, “If the donors say this money is for 
Afghanistan…the money should be spent in the country and not go out.”144  Some 
participants at a recent strategic planning workshop on Afghan demining worried that if 
demining is seen as a profitmaking activity, humanitarian donors may begin to withdraw 
from supporting it.145 
7.1. Summary 
Thus it is possible that the commercialization of demining will turn mine and UXO 
clearance into a purchasable commodity, making it easier for those with access to 
significant financial resources to change priorities.  It is possible that this could lead to a 
loss of the attempted fairness in the UNMACA system, which distributed demining with 
at least some consideration of need, rather than ability to pay.  UNMACA chief of staff 
Kerei Ruru assured the author that UNMACA plans to maintain the NGO system at its 
“current capacity,” but admitted this was reliant on them being able to “keep getting 
donor funding to support that.”146 
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8. The Securitization of Aid 
Just as the early US funding for demining in Afghanistan in the late 1980s was 
motivated by a broader war effort, current US assistance to the country is motivated 
largely by security objectives. Afghanistan is seen as a location of immense strategic 
importance in the Global War on Terror – “key to the U.S. top-priority goal of promoting 
stability and democracy in the Middle East and Central Asian regions.”147 Thus US aid to 
the country has bolstered its broader strategic objectives of promoting political stability, 
countering the blooming narcotics trade and fostering support for the US-led effort to 
eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban insurgency. The first paragraph of USAID’s current 
Strategic Plan for Afghanistan asserts that USAID is “a critical partner” in the “fight 
against terrorism and tyranny.”  The plan, identifying a “Nexus between security and 
reconstruction and development,” states that all of USAID’s activities are “geared 
towards increasing security.”148 
Likewise, much demining assistance given to Afghanistan after 2001 has focused on 
US security priorities.  The funding from the military, contracted through commercial 
companies, has been for clearing bases and airstrips.  Moreover, UXB received a sub-
contract from DynCorp to provide demining and explosive ordnance disposal services to 
US-funded forced poppy eradication efforts.149  Funding from civilian agencies also fits 
into supporting the US’s broader security objectives.  As noted before, the increase in 
funding for insecure ammunition disposal aims to deny weapons to the insurgency. The 
US State Department has also announced plans to support “IED [Improvised Explosive 
Device] threat reduction efforts” – IEDs pose a major threat to NATO forces – as part of 
its overall mine action strategy.150 
The major advantage of the US’ re-engagement in Afghanistan is that that it has made 
significant resources available.  For the last few years, the US has provided over a quarter 
of the funding for demining in Afghanistan.  US leadership encourages other countries to 
put additional money forward. Indeed, had the US not re-engaged with Afghanistan’s 
politics and development, and lobbying other countries to do so, it is likely that 
UNMACA would have continued at its pre-9/11 level ad infinitum, or slowly fizzled 
away. 
Moreover, Bob Gannon of RONCO argues that the work commercial deminers are 
doing, by supporting the stabilization of Afghanistan, has a greater impact on the peace 
process than NGO clearance.  Since security is a key problem for the Afghan people, he 
believes it is important that demining supports the Coalition and particularly the nascent 
Afghan security forces:  
If you can get a stable government in a country then it’s going to go a long way towards 
bringing proper peace. And the way to get a stable government, is to make sure the government’s 
got the land, the property it needs to put good governance in place.151 
 
However, there are several problems with aid motivated by security concerns. Firstly, 
it means there are influences on priorities other than pure humanitarian need.  By taking 
money out of the UN-led system, USAID will be directing its funds to support the US 
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reconstruction efforts.  While Afghanistan certainly needs the roads, powerlines, schools 
and clinics built by these efforts, studies by other investigators have shown that many of 
these massive projects seem to be more for political and symbolic, rather than 
humanitarian, impact, sometimes affecting the quality of the work.152 Indeed, studies by 
UNDP/World Bank and MCPA have shown that the highest economic returns from come 
from focusing demining efforts on irrigation and irrigated agriculture, not roads, which 
USAID has concentrated on.153  If other donors pull their money out of the UN-led 
program and focus on supporting their particular national interests in Afghanistan, who 
will advocate for a needs-based demining that prioritizes the poor, refugee or at-risk? 
Secondly, one must problematize the word ‘security’ when used by the US and its 
coalition.  There is no doubt that security is in desperate need in Afghanistan.  However, 
one must question whose security the US is aiming to secure.  For instance, a significant 
portion of US troops and military budget are assigned to the hunt for Bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda, which affects the national security of the US more than human security of the 
Afghan people.154  By shifting the focus of US-funded demining away from the needs-
based system of the UN to supporting the Coalition’s military objectives, the US is 
prioritizing its own security over that of the Afghan people.  While this is natural for a 
state to do, it is not necessarily the most beneficial option for Afghanistan. The US’s 
choice of the Pakistan-based mujahideen parties as the implementers of their cross-border 
humanitarian aid in the 1980s should offer a warning.  Significant portions of assistance 
went to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who went on to commit terrible atrocities in the post-
Communist era and is now fighting the US-led coalition. 
Thirdly, there is a danger that Afghan demining may lose its precious and long-
cultivated neutrality if deminers are seen to be too close to the Coalition. Insurgents will 
not have to think hard to see that demining will play an integral role in bringing new US-
funded infrastructure throughout the country.  US-funded roads will improve the 
logistical capability of the Coalition, new schools will provide the Coalition-sponsored 
government the opportunity to wean children away from Islamist instruction.  These are 
all potentially good things, but the resurgent Taliban, which are following a spoiler 
strategy, may begin to target deminers to prevent further reconstruction efforts. One 
could argue that it is good to put commercial contractors rather than NGOs on tasks that 
will draw fire, but it is possible that the blurring lines between the Coalition and deminers 
may negatively affect all deminers, not just the commercial ones. Already, according to 
UNMACA data, between January and November 2006 more demining personnel died in 
terrorist attacks than demining accidents.   
Fourthly, as commercial companies doing military demining begin to bid on US 
civilian reconstruction tasks, this could even further blur the lines between military and 
civilian work.  When Afghans see the same companies doing civilian demining providing 
services to the military the potential for misunderstanding is great.155  The April 2007 
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ambush of a RONCO demining team by “dozens of Taliban militants” in western Farah 
province does not bode well, though it is not clear whether RONCO itself was the 
intended target.156  
Many of these companies, including DynCorp, ArmorGroup and RONCO, have other 
divisions that are providing private security services and several companies’ staff also 
carry arms.  Mohammed Sediq of UNMACA worries that a key to mine action’s success 
in Afghanistan, its “flag of impartiality and neutrality,” may be eroded by the image of 
these companies.157 For instance, all the DynCorp mine action staff have to take weapons 
training, carry a pistol and rifle while traveling and the team have access to a DynCorp 
rapid reaction force if they come under attack.158  DynCorp itself has come under a great 
deal of criticism for its Afghan security operations.159 ArmorGroup has an entire military 
style-barracks on Kabul’s outskirts. RONCO provides static guards around Kabul and 
provides bomb detection dogs to security companies guarding the US embassy and other 
sites.160  Thus some Afghans may jump to the conclusion that demining is an activity 
related to private security operations.  This would not be a good thing, as private security 
companies, especially international ones, have a bad reputation among Afghans.  Rimli 
and Schmeidl’s research, confirmed by the author’s own discussions with Afghans, found 
that  
Overall, PSCs are not seen in a positive light in Afghanistan.  While PSCs may provide 
security for their clients, they are considered not to enhance the security of the general population.  
Much rather those interviewed suggested that the PSC presence leads to a sense of distrust or even 
insecurity. 161  
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The USAID demining coordinator, who, interestingly, is also the coordinator for 
security for USAID projects, told the author that even if the demining company does not 
have a private security arm, other private security companies will be involved in guarding 
the US reconstruction projects.162  One Afghan NGO director has already had a bad 
experience with this type of arrangement.  He explained that when the NGO was 
providing demining to support the reconstruction of the Kabul to Kandahar road, they 
were required to have an escort from an American private security contractor.  He said 
that this “damaged us a lot because…the Taliban and the opposition thought that we are 
now with the Americans and with the military.” 
Finally, while the Afghan NGOs are more like UN contractors than traditional 
notions of ‘civil society,’ they have proven able to play an advocacy role – highlighting 
humanitarian issues and recommending policy.  The Afghan NGOs together form the 
Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL), which has successfully pushed 
Afghanistan to sign the Mine Ban Treaty, and has raised some objections to the fact that 
the US is a non-signator.163  Commercial companies, whose main motivation is profit, not 
humanitarianism, are far less likely to question US policy in Afghanistan and have much 
less organizational autonomy from the US government.164  For instance when the author 
asked RONCO’s president, Stephen Edelmann to comment on their programs in 
Afghanistan he said, “I suggest you talk to the State Department because I don’t want to 
say something that might jeopardize the position of the company.”165  Likewise, 
DynCorp’s mine action coordinator told the author, “State Department is paying 
DynCorp to represent them on the WRA [State Department Office for Weapons Removal 
and Abatement] project so our logo says WRA on it, our letterhead says WRA and we are 
listed here in country as WRA and we are accredited as WRA Afghanistan.”166 
8.1 Summary 
There is a danger that the commercialization of demining is occurring in tandem with 
the securitization of US demining assistance.  The greater involvement of private security 
companies and the linking of demining projects to US strategic objectives for 
Afghanistan could: 
1) Draw priorities away from the people who need demining the most, 
2) Damage the perception of neutrality that demining has enjoyed, 
3) Marginalize NGOs involved in demining that have genuine criticisms of US 
policy, in favor of more deferential commercial contractors. 
9. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Despite the complaints of weakness in the UNMACA-led demining system in 
Afghanistan, it has achieved a remarkable amount, considering the extremely difficult 
political and economic situations it has faced.  By the end of 2005, local and international 
NGOs under the UN umbrella had cleared almost 156,000 mines and over 8.6 million 
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UXO from over 1 billion square meters.167  Because it was designed as a public service, it 
has largely tried to prioritize demining according to humanitarian and socio-economic 
need.  The much needed reforms that have taken place since 2001 have increased the 
capacity of the UN-led program and made the structure more efficient and better targeted.  
Harpviken has called the Afghan demining program “a vital and inspiring force in 
[humanitarian mine action] internationally.”168 
Since 2005, the market for demining has undergone some deregulation, as 
commercial demining actors were accredited and allowed to compete for military and 
commercial reconstruction work (much of which is funded by government donors).  By 
taking its money out of the UN-led program and moving to a commercial contracting 
model, USAID is particularly responsible for the growing commercialization of the 
demining sector, which is likely to expand in the coming years.  This has the potential to 
enhance the capacity of Afghan demining, through greater profit-driven efficiency, 
innovation and specialization.  Moreover, it is unlikely that many NGOs would be able, 
or willing, to do mine and UXO clearance tasks for the Coalition and Afghan militaries.  
Thus some involvement of commercial companies in Afghan demining should be 
welcomed. 
However, the US-led commercialization of Afghan demining does raise some 
concerns.  Firstly, the commercial drive to cut costs may actually decrease the quality and 
safety of the demining process. Indeed, the data suggesting this is much more reliable that 
the data suggesting the cost and productivity gains from commercial demining.  
Secondly, the commodification of demining has the potential to draw resources away 
from humanitarian demining, prioritizing those with money, rather than those in need.  
Finally, the commercialization process is occurring in tandem with US aid focusing on 
strategic security interests in the country.  The marrying of security and reconstruction 
objectives, and the involvement of private security companies in demining projects may 
damage the UN-led program’s long-cultivated perception of neutrality.  The UN claims 
that through “thoroughly integrating” USAID into its planning and coordination efforts it 
is already tackling these problems. 169  However, ongoing vigilance is advised. 
The fact that many government donors have decided to stick with the UN-led, NGO-
implemented process is, in the author’s opinion, a good thing, and has been encouraged 
by UNMACA reform.  An ongoing and rigorous commitment to greater improvements in 
technical and management capacity, accountability, data collection and transparency 
within the UN-led process will bolster the attractiveness of funding it.  As Chris Stephens 
of UNMACA noted, “change, internal and external, has led to an increase in donor 
confidence.”170 
Acknowledging that to a large degree commercialization is a fait accompli, the author 
has the following recommendations: 
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To UNMACA: 
1. Build confidence in the UN-led system by addressing weaknesses in transparency 
and perceptions of unnecessary bureaucratic inertia. 
2. Continue with organizational reform to improve donor reporting, transparency, 
better data collection and operational efficiency. 
3. Commission a study into the economic, political and social impacts of the 
commercialization of demining in Afghanistan, and ways to make best use of the 
commercial potential. 
4. Rapidly expand the capacity of the quality management structure of UNMACA 
and centralize the reporting from these teams in a headquarters database. 
5. Improve the demining accident database and integrate this into IMSMA 
(Information Management System for Mine Action) properly. 
6. Collate and analyze the quality management and accident data regularly and take 
accreditation away from organization that have consistently poor safety records. 
7. Fundraise aggressively to maintain the humanitarian demining capacity at its 
current level. 
8. Strengthen the NGO sector by encouraging transparency, building technical 
capacity and introducing elements of moderate competition for grants, so they are 
able to stem the hemorrhaging of talent to commercial companies. 
 
To the agencies of the US government: 
1. Maintain some funding for the UN-led system, conditional on improvements in 
transparency, efficiency and data reporting. 
2. Support a UN-commissioned study into the economic, political and social impacts 
of the commercialization of demining in Afghanistan. 
3. Ensure that reconstruction demining contractors are penalized for poor safety 
practices. 
4. Strengthen the NGO sector by encouraging transparency, building technical 
capacity and introducing elements of moderate competition for grants, so they are 
able to stem the hemorrhaging of talent to commercial companies. 
5. Give security clearance to more UNMACA quality management inspectors to 
observe the work of commercial contractors in Coalition secure areas. 
6. Include tight caveat in commercials contracts emphasizing and ensuring the 
power of UNMACA is maintained. Ensure that contracts mandate submission of 
all clearance and accident data to them in a timely manner. 
7. Be cautious about introducing commercialization into other demining programs in 
other countries. 
 
To other bilateral donors: 
1. Maintain and bolster funding for the UN-led demining system, conditional on 
improvements in transparency, operational efficiency and data reporting. 
2. Support a UN-commissioned study into the economic, political and social impacts 
of the commercialization of demining in Afghanistan. 
3. Include tight caveats in commercials contracts emphasizing and ensuring the 
power of UNMACA is maintained. Ensure that contracts mandate submission of 
all clearance and accident data to them in a timely manner. 
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4. Be cautious about introducing commercialization into other demining programs in 
other countries. 
 
To prime reconstruction contractors: 
1. Improve coordination with UNMACA, make sure they are fully aware of all 
demining and BAC contracts. 
2. Include tight caveats in commercials contracts emphasizing and ensuring the 
power of UNMACA is maintained.  Ensure that contracts mandate submission of 
all clearance and accident data to them in a timely manner. 
3. Consider making client-provided private quality assurance inspection reports 
available in one central location (ideally UNMACA) so information on contractor 
performance is available to all clients. 
 
To commercial demining companies: 
1. Improve coordination with UNMACA, make sure they are fully aware of all 
demining and BAC operations, and submit all clearance and accident data to them 
in a timely manner. 
2. Resist the temptation to cut corners in the SOPs, or to speed up the demining 
process beyond what is safe. 
3. Consider the negative implications of using a private security capacity and having 
employees bearing arms, and the impact on the image of all demining agencies.   
4. Go first to the pool of unemployed deminers for labor, rather than hiring talent 
away the Afghan NGOs.  Consider setting payscales at an appropriate level, in 
consultation with UNMACA. 
 
To the Afghan NGOs: 
1. Build donor confidence by continuing to improve transparency, technical 
competence and management capacity. 
2. Consider adopting some of the new technologies and innovations brought into the 
country by commercial operators. 
3. Deal with the tough question of how the Afghan Demining Group’s (ADG) 
profits will be distributed among the five NGOs and make a legal, written 
agreement. 
4. Maintain close supervision over ADG to ensure it maintains the highest possible 
standards of clearance. 
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10. Annex: Profiles of Commercial Demining Companies 
Operating in Afghanistan 
10.1. International Companies 
 
ArmorGroup: Formerly Defence Systems Limited (DSL), ArmorGroup is a private 
security company listed on the London Stock Exchange.  On a contract with the UK 
Foreign Office, ArmorGroup provides security for all British government personnel and 
buildings in Afghanistan.  It won the renewal of this contract, worth $38.5 million a year, 
in November 2006.171  ArmorGroup also provides security and driving training for 
international organizations and Afghan security forces. ‘Weapons Reduction and Mine 
Action’ is one of ArmorGroup’s core functions and it is one of the US State 
Department’s three main worldwide contractors for such services.172  At the time of the 
author’s fieldwork, ArmorGroup was doing market research on whether to provide mine 
action services in Afghanistan. See:  
http://www.armorgroup.com/services/servicesmineaction 
 
DynCorp International: With roots in the civilian and military aviation sector, DynCorp 
has grown into a massive global company, based in Falls Church, Virgina, USA, 
providing additional services in infrastructure, security and logistics.  In the last ten years, 
DynCorp has become a significant player in the private security market, fielding civilian 
peacekeepers in 11 countries, providing logistical support to the US military, guarding 
US diplomatic compounds and personnel and engaging in illicit drug eradication.  In 
Afghanistan, DynCorp has run several high-profile private security operations including 
guarding President Hamid Karzai, opium poppy eradication, and training the Afghan 
police. As one of the State Department’s three main worldwide contractors for mine 
action,173 DynCorp holds its contract for Afghanistan, where DynCorp is building the 
capacity of the Afghan demining organizations, funding destruction of mine and small 
arms stockpiles and other mine action activities. See: http://www.dyn-
intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=43 
 
EOD Technology, Inc.: Founded in 1987, EODT is a military contractor which began 
providing munitions disposal services to US bases.  It has recently seen rapid growth, 20-
fold in the last five years, buoyed especially by private security contracts in Iraq.  At the 
time of the author’s fieldwork, EODT was conducting minefield and battle area clearance 
in the military area of Afghanistan’s Kabul International Airport on a contract with the 
US Air Force.174  See: http://www.eodt.com 
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MineTech International: Started in 1992 by Col. Lionel Dyck, who served in both the 
Rhodesian and Zimbabwean armed forces, MineTech is based in both the UK and 
Zimbabwe. Now owned by Exploration Logistics PLC, which provides logisitical, safety 
and medical support largely to the oil and gas industry. MineTech has cleared minefields 
in Mozambique, the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, Nicaragua, Lebanon and Iraq.  Since 
2004, MineTech, with around 100 staff in Afghanistan, has engaged in several clearance 
tasks on several military bases and for the International Organization for Migration175 and 
provides explosive detection dogs to security firms. See: http://www.minetech.co.uk 
 
RONCO Consulting Corporation: Founded as an international development consulting 
firm in 1974, RONCO found its primary raison d’etre while starting up USAID’s early 
Afghan demining efforts in 1989. Since then it has been a dominant player in the 
commercial demining market with operations in over 30 countries. RONCO is currently 
the biggest mine action company in Afghanistan, having returned to the country in 2002. 
As one of the three main worldwide State Department demining contractors,176 it held the 
State Department contract for building local capacity in Afghanistan until this was lost to 
DynCorp in August 2005. It has since cleared tasks for both military and commercial 
clients and had a revenue of about $5-6 million in 2006.177  It was recently awarded a 
three year $16.4 million mine action contract from the Army Corps of Engineers.178 
RONCO also has a small, low-profile, private security operation in Afghanistan guarding 
several compounds and providing explosive detection dogs to other security 
companies.179  See: http://www.roncoconsulting.com 
 
S3 AG: Registered in Switzerland, S3, along with European Land Solutions (ELS) 
(formed out of MONTANEISEN GmbH and Greenfield Consultants Ltd) and Asian 
Land Solutions (ALS), is a member of Sefinor Group, whose constituent companies 
specialize in mine and UXO clearance and have operations in Bosnia, Kuwait, Iraq, the 
Russian Federation, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.  In Afghanistan they have 
conducted clearance tasks for the US military and in the military area of Kabul 
International Airport.  See: http://www.s3ag.ch or http://www.sefinor.com or 
http://www.land-solutions.com 
 
UXB International: Founded in 1983 as the first US company specializing in munitions 
disposal, UXB has conducted mine action, explosive ordnance disposal and private 
security operations in 23 countries.  In Afghanistan UXB has had several subcontracts 
with DynCorp, providing EOD support for poppy eradication efforts and technical 
advisors for the State Department capacity building grant.  They have also conducted 
clearance operations in the military area of Kabul International Airport. See: 
http://www.uxb.com 
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10.2. Afghan-Owned Companies 
 
Hemayatbrothers International Demining Company (HID): Started in May 2006 by 
Kefayatullah Eblagh, director of ATC, an Afghan demining NGO, HID was 
Afghanistan’s first local demining company.  Finally accredited by UNMACA in 
September 2006, it had completed six tasks in Kabul, Kunduz, Badakhshan and Herat 
provinces, on subcontracts to UXB.  With a total of 100 staff, drawn largely from 
unemployed deminers trained in UNDP’s demobilization program, it had two demining 
teams. See: http://www.hidcompany.com 
 
OMAR International: Registered in Dubai, this is a commercial partner to the Afghan 
demining NGO of the same name.  It has remained dormant for some time, but OMAR 
director, Fazel Fazel, spoke to the author about reviving it for commercial operations. 
 
Afghan Demining Group: In its nascent stages during the author’s fieldwork, this local 
company is owned by all five of the main Afghan demining NGOs, giving it access to a 
broad ‘tool-box’ of mine action specializations, including manual, mechanical and dog 
demining as well as a survey capacity. 
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